Making IP = PSPACE Practical: Efficient Interactive Protocols for BDD Algorithms

Published at CAV 2023

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September 11, 2023

Outline



Is this formula satisfiable?

$$(x \lor y \lor \neg z)$$

$$\land (\neg x \lor \neg z \lor w)$$

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No...

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No... at least my SAT-solver says so!

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It suffices to ensure correctness of the certificate checker

SAT – boolean satisfiability



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QBF - quantified boolean satisfiability



This talk applies to QBF as well.

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- Essentially a list of clauses, each of which is implied by the previous clauses
- Properties:
 - "efficiently" checkable
 - long (exponential in size of the input)
- Certificates can be many terabytes (!) in size
 - e.g. 200 TiB in [Heule,Kullmann,Marek 2016] to solve the boolean Pythagorean Triples problem

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- Huge resolution proofs are difficult to handle
- In some cases, it can take even longer to verify the proof than to solve the instance (!)

Polynomial-time certification?!

No.

No. However...

- ► certainty
- non-interactivity

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We gain:



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 - ▶ i.e. SAT, QBF, model counting, ...
























Verifier

Prover





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One-sided error

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- ▶ IP is the class of problems that admit such a protocol

Interactive Protocols – Summary

We sacrifice:



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- ► Split performance-critical and trusted parts of software

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Problem: how do we generate interactive certificates with practical approaches?

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- Unique encoding of boolean functions with efficient boolean operations
- Are used effectively for QBF, CTL model checking (and many other problems)
 - ▶ not as good for SAT, though



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where T is the time the BDD algorithm takes to solve φ .

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Theorem. Let φ denote a QBF instance with *n* variables.

- 1. Verifier executes in time $\mathcal{O}(n^2|\varphi|) \approx 0$, with negligible failure probability $\approx 10^{-10}$, and
- 2. Prover takes $O(T) \approx 3T$ time to solve φ and answer Verifier's challenges,
- where T is the time the BDD algorithm takes to solve φ .

(constants in practice)

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- We compare against state-of-the-art QBF solvers CAQE, DepQBF and PGBDDQ
- DepQBF and PGBDDQ are certifying as well, using extended resolution proofs
- Benchmarks are taken from the crafted instances track of the QBF Evaluation 2022



Time to verify certificate (Verifier / external specialised checkers)



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- ► Can be applied to any BDD algorithm

More Power!

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Using this one simple trick...

















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- ► This increases the power to NEXP
- Seems reasonable in practice

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- ▶ With a reset-button, we can run the certification on-the-fly

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- With a reset-button, this seems possible

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- Competitive performance (blic solves 96 of 172 benchmarks, others 98, 91 and 87)
- ▶ Generating interactive certificates is low-overhead (factor ~3)
- Error probability is negligible ($\leq 10^{-10}$)
- Can be applied to any BDD algorithm

Thank you for your attention! Questions?

