NSWI101: SYSTEM BEHAVIOUR MODELS AND VERIFICATION 8. BOUNDED, INFINITE-STATE MC, COMPOSITIONAL REASONING

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- Bounded model checking
- Infinite-state model checking
- Compositional reasoning



Part I: Bounded Model Checking

BOUNDED MODEL CHECKING





Property specification

BOUNDED MODEL CHECKING





Property specification



- Let $M = \{S, I, R, L\}$ be Kripke structure
- Define predicate $Reach(s, s') \equiv R(s, s')$

•
$$\llbracket M \rrbracket^k = \bigwedge_{i=0}^{k-1} \operatorname{Reach}(s_i, s_{i+1})$$

- [M]^k contains states reachable in exactly k steps
- Then search for counterexamples formed by *k* states

DSS

Input: $M, \neg \varphi$

- 1. k = 0
- 2. Is $\neg \varphi$ satisfiable in $\llbracket M \rrbracket^k$?
 - YES: $M \models \neg \varphi$, terminate
- 3. Is k <threshold?
 - NO: $M \not\models_k \neg \varphi$, terminate
- 4. Increment k
- 5. Go to 2.

Realized by constructing formula capturing transitions in program

- trying to reach assertion violation, i.e., violation of formula AG (p)
- checking for its satisfiability using SAT/SMT solver
 - SAT/SMT solvers tools for deciding satisfiability of logical formulae
 - satisfying assignment of formulae containing negated property corresponds to counter-example
 - NP-complete problem the hard part of verification



```
1: int i=4;
2: int s=0;
3: while (1) {
4: s+=i;
5: if (i>0)
6: i--;
7: assert(s<10);
8: }
```

BMC – EXAMPLE



First unwind loops up to bound (k).

```
1: int i=4;
2: int s=0;
3: while (1) {
4: s+=i;
5: if (i>0)
6: i--;
7: assert(s<10);
8: }
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1: int i=4;
2: int s=0;
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4: s+=i;
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7: assert(s<10);
8: s+=i;
```

```
11: assert(s<10);
```

BMC – EXAMPLE



Transform each line of code into (CNF) formula.

1: int i=4; 2: int s = 0;3: 4: s+=i; 5: **if** (i>0) 6: i – –; 7: **assert**(s<10); 8: s+=i; 9: **if** (i>0) 10: i - -; 11: **assert**(s<10);

$$\begin{array}{l} f_1: (pc_1=1) \land (i_2=4) \land (pc_2=2) \\ f_2: (pc_2=2) \land (i_3=i_2) \land (s_3=0) \land (pc_3=3) \\ f_3: (pc_3=3) \land (i_4=i_3) \land (s_4=s_3) \land (pc_4=4) \\ f_4: (pc_4=4) \land (i_5=i_4) \land (s_5=s_4+i_4) \land (pc_5=5) \\ f_5: (pc_5=5) \land (i_6=i_5) \land (s_6=s_5) \land (pc_6=6) \\ f_6: (pc_6=6) \land (((i_6>0) \land (i_7=i_6-1)) \lor \\ ((i_6\leq 0) \land (i_7=i_6))) \land (s_7=s_6) \land (pc_7=7) \\ f_7: (pc_7=7) \land (s_7\geq 10) \land (pc_8=8) \\ f_8: (pc_8=8) \land (i_9=i_8) \land (s_9=s_8+i_8) \land (pc_9=9) \\ f_9: (pc_1=10) \land (((i_1>0) \land (i_{11}=i_{10}-1)) \lor \\ ((i_10\leq 0) \land (i_{11}=i_{10}))) \land (s_{11}=s_{10}) \land (pc_{11}=11) \\ f_{11}: (pc_{11}=11) \land (s_{11}\geq 10) \land (pc_{12}=12) \\ \end{array}$$

BMC – EXAMPLE



Transform each line of code into (CNF) formula.

1: int i=4; 2: int s = 0;3: 4: s+=i; 5: **if** (i>0) 6: i – –; 7: **assert**(s<10); 8: s+=i; 9: **if** (i>0) 10: i - -; 11: **assert**(s<10);

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- Assertion expressions are negated we are searching for violations
- Formula to be checked for satisfiability: $f = \bigwedge_{i=0..k} f_i$
- Found satisfying assignment correspond to violation of original formula
- If *f* is unsatisfiable, there is no violation in *k* steps



- When applied on software, BMC itself cannot prove general absence of assertion violations
 - it is useful to discover them
 - there are extensions to BMC (unbounded model checking) aiming at proving absence of violations
- When applied on pieces of hardware, it can prove their absence
 - number of steps (its upper bound) of particular operations is known



- Bounds can be useful finding shortest counter-examples
- By including loop invariants (which are difficult to compute, though) into BMC, infinite paths can be verified



Part II: Infinite-State Model Checking



- Finite models are sometimes insufficient
 - Protocols and circuits specification can be parametrized by size of int type (CPU), number of processors in multicore environment, of communicating network nodes,
- Even though model checking of general infinite-state models is impossible, special cases can be model-checked



- Infinite family of systems: $\mathcal{F} = \{M_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$
- Verification task: assume *f* to be temporal formula, verify: $\forall i : M_i \models f$
- Generally, this is still undecidable we have to add more assumptions later
- Indexed CTL (ICTL) formula for each system component
 - *i*-th formula applied onto *i*-th component
 - allows for special expressions: $\wedge_i f(i)$, $\vee_i f(i)$, $\wedge f(j)$, and $\bigvee f(j)$

DSS

Simple token ring

• atomic propositions:

non-critical section, keeping token, critical section, receive token, send token

One process Q originally keeping token (t), several processes P_i originally in state n





Synchronous composition Q||P with natural synchronization of s and r





Synchronous composition Q||P with natural synchronization of s and r



Generally, token ring family: $\mathcal{F} = \{Q | | P_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$, desired property: $\bigwedge_i AG(c_i \implies \bigwedge_{j \neq i} \neg c_j)$



How to prove the property when there are infinitely many *P* processes? We have to find generalizing structure – *invariant*:

- Let $\mathcal{F} = \{Q || P_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$ be family of structures
- Let ≥ be reflexive, transitive relation on structures
- Invariant I is structure such that $\forall i : I \geq M_i$
- Relation ≥ determine properties that can be checked:
 - \geq is bisimulation \implies strong preservation: $I \models f \Leftrightarrow M \models f$
 - \geq is simulation preorder \implies weak preservation: $I \models f \implies M \models f$
 - Similarly for language-level preorder and equivalence

Token ring example: Token rings of size *n* and 2 are in simulation preorder \implies sufficient to verify just whether $(P||Q) \models f$





 $(t,n) \mapsto (t,n,n)$ $(c,n) \mapsto (c,n,n)$ $(n,t) \mapsto (n,t,n)$ $(n,t) \mapsto (n,n,t)$ $(n,c)\mapsto (n,c,n)$ $(n, c) \mapsto (n, n, c)$





Definition: Composition || is monotonic w.r.t. relation $\geq \Leftrightarrow$ $\forall P_1, P'_1, P_2, P'_2 : P_1 \geq P'_1 \land P_2 \geq P'_2 \implies P_1 || P_2 \geq P'_1 || P'_2$

Lemma: Let \geq be a reflexive, transitive relation and let || be a composition operator that is monotonic w.r.t. \geq If $I \geq P$ and $I \geq I || P$, then $\forall i : I \geq P^i$, where $\mathcal{F} = \{P^i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$.

This is more like:

"This holds once we have the relation" than "How to find the relation"

Finding suitable relation is hard and not possible in algorithmic way – problem is undecidable in general.



Part III: Compositional Reasoning



- Efficient verification algorithms can extend applicability of formal methods
- Many systems can be decomposed into parts
 - verifying properties of each part separately
 - if conjunction of parts properties implies overall specification, we are done
 - the entire system never analysed as whole



- Three communication-protocol actors: sender, network, receiver
- Overall specification:
 - Data correctly transmitted from sender to receiver
- Partial specifications:
 - Data correctly sent from sender to network
 - Data correctly transmitted via network
 - Data correctly transmitted from network to receiver
- Verification of partial specifications typically much easier
 - sum of state spaces much smaller than state space of entire system (impact of state space explosion mitigated)



- Verifies each component separately
- Based on specification of
 - Assumptions requirements on behaviour of environment
 - Guarantees provisions offered to environment if assumptions are met
 - environment = the other components
- By combining assumptions and guarantees of particular parts, it is possible to establish correctness of entire system
- Full transition graph never constructed



- Formula capturing assume-guarantee principle is triple $\langle g \rangle M \langle f \rangle$ where g, f are temporal formulae and M is program
 - whenever M is part of system satisfying g, system also guarantees f
- Composition of proofs: $(\langle g \rangle M' \langle f \rangle) \land (\langle true \rangle M \langle g \rangle) \implies \langle true \rangle M ||M' \langle f \rangle$

• Can be expressed as inference rule:

 $\langle true
angle M \langle g
angle \ \langle g
angle M' \langle f
angle \ \langle true
angle M || M' \langle f
angle$



Necessary to avoid circular dependencies making reasoning unsound:

 $\begin{array}{c} \langle f \rangle \mathsf{M} \langle g \rangle \\ \langle g \rangle \mathsf{M}' \langle f \rangle \end{array} \\ \hline \mathsf{M} || \mathsf{M}' \models f \land g \end{array}$

Again: This is not incorrect!

D3S

- Each component specifies not only provided (implemented) interfaces
 - similarly as objects do
- But also required ones
 - in addition to objects
- Syntactic (type) information may or may not consider interface/type inheritance
- Semantic (behaviour) specification usage protocols, restrictions beyond language capabilities, ...
 - can cover various aspects of component functional and extra-functional properties: allowed sequences of messages/calls, timing, reliability, resource usage, security, ...
 - composability verification based on the same principle as syntax: each component should provide at least as much (as good, fast, reliable, ...) as its environment requires



- Syntax usually checked by compiler and no additional effort required
- Semantics code annotations (code contracts):
 - at level of functions/methods
 - assumptions preconditions
 - guarantees postconditions
 - usually also invariants loop invariants
- Verification is modular:
 - each function is verified separately whether execution of each function really guarantees its postcondition if precondition is satisfied upon function entry
 - if function is called from within another function, its contract is used
 - precondition checked
 - postcondition is assumed



It is not easy to specify contracts:

- too weak preconditions make it difficult to guarantee postconditions
- too strong preconditions are hard to be satisfied by callers
- too strong postconditions are hard to be proven
- too weak postconditions usually do not "satisfy" callers
- One has to know and tune...
- There are approaches for real programming languages
 - Spec#, JML, Code Contracts, Nagini, Dafny...
 - backed by verification tools model checkers, SAT/SMT solvers, theorem provers